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"ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT" IN NEW YORK
The draftsmen of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion law, borrowing a phrase from the British statute,'
directed the payment of compensation by employers to em-
ployees for disability or death from injury ". . . arising
out of and in the course of employment .... "2 This simply
worded phrase, found now in the compensation statutes of
at least forty states and the Federal Government,3 has been
defined so many times in the various jurisdictions that it
spreads itself over more than one hundred pages of Words
and Phrases.' Everyone claims to know what it means, but
its application to particular facts harasses lawyers, admin-
istrators and judges. Forty years ago, the English Court
of Appeal accurately pointed out that the first part of the
phrase describes the character or quality of the accident,
while the latter part introduces the idea that an accident
to be compensable must in some sense be due to the employ-
ment, and must result from a risk reasonably incident to
the employment.5
Since its law was enacted, New York state alone has
dealt with more than forty million workmen's compensation
claims, small and large, contested and uncontested. Each
one required an application of the phrase we are concerned
with here, and vast numbers of them involved contests over
its application to special facts. For that reason, one cannot
in an article such as this attempt to summarize the entirety
of the New York law on the subject. What will be attempted
in this article is a sampling of decisions from one court, the
New York Court of Appeals, where application of the phrase
1 The Workmen's Compensation Law, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. 5, c. 84, § 1(1).
2 NEw YORK'S WORKM 's'S COmPENSATION LAW § 10.
3 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1425
(1927), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (1946).
4 4 WORDS AND PHRASES 18-147 (perm. ed. 1940).
5 Fitzgerald v. W. G. Clarke & Son, [1908] 2 K. B. 796.
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has resulted, unless otherwise stated, in the affirmance of
an award. Limiting our field still further, this article will
deal only with a few fact areas of recent and particular
interest. Cases involving occupational disease claims and
awards 6 are omitted entirely. Finally, readers are reminded
that under the New York statute, a decision of the Work-
men's Compensation Board is "final as to all questions of
fact," so that no New York court can review administrative
findings of fact.7
I.
Injuries Going to Work
Injuries sustained by employees while going to work have
provided some of the most difficult problems. The deter-
minative factor in each case seemed to be whether the em-
ployee's actions were motivated by furtherance of the em-
ployer's interest. Quite significant in this category of cases
are Scott v. U. S. 0. Camp Shows Inc.,8 and Lyons v. U. S.
0. Camp Shows Inc? Both Scott and Lyons were profes-
sional entertainers employed by the USO, under direction
of the United States Army, to tour the camps in the Ameri-
can occupation zone in Germany. During a break in their
schedule, Scott and Lyons went to Paris. While returning
to Frankfort to rejoin the company, the automobile in which
they were riding collided with another. The compensation
board made findings that at the time of the mishap the
actors had returned to their employment because they were
en route to their next engagement at the time the injuries
were sustained.
The discovery of a theretofore unknown fact enabled the
claimant to recover in a unique application of the going-to-
work concept. In Manville v. New York State Dept. of
6 NEw Yonx Wo~xME's CO ENSATiON LAW § 3(2).
7 NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON LAW § 20.
8 298 N. Y. 896,84 N.E. (2d) 808 (1949).
9 298 N. Y. 897, 84 N. E. (2d) 808 (1949).
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Labor,'° a state employee was injured in a fall on the side-
walk in front of the State Office Building in Albany. Al-
though the sidewalk was to all appearances an ordinary
public one, it was discovered that the fee simple was in the
State of New York. Therefore, since the state was Man-
ville's employer, there was adequate basis for the finding
that the accident had taken place after the worker had en-
tered the employer's premises while proceeding to work.
A similar approach resulted in an award where the claimant
was forced to climb over the coupling between the cab and
trailer of a truck, so parked at a loading platform as to
block the usual entrance to the place of employment." It
was held that the employee was in the course of his em-
ployment in attempting to gain entrance to his employer's
building, and that the employer was liable for the failure
to provide safe access to the building.
Claims of employees injured while away from the physical
place of work are honored when there is a reasonable basis
in the record for a holding that some furtherance of the
employer's business was involved in the particular journey,
even though the major part of the worker's purpose was
personal to himself." These cases fall into the going-to-
work category because in each of them there was, in one
way or another, evidentiary justification for a finding that
whatever the employee was doing at the particular instant,
he was approaching a place of actual work on orders of his
employer. 3 Thus, salesmen who used their automobiles in
their employer's business were allowed compensation de-
10 294 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. (2d) 780 (1944).
11 Leatham v. Thurston & Braidich et al., 289 N. Y. 804, 47 N. E. (2d) 51
(1943).
12 Buholtz v. Kearse et al., 291 N. Y. 694, 52 N. E. (2d) 590 (1943); Krist4
ianson v. Lehman et al., 287 N. Y. 569, 38 N. E. (2d) 230 (1941) ; Oram v. Byron'
C. Moon Co. et al., 285 N. Y. 42, 32 N. E. (2d) 785 (1941).
13 See, e.g., Nagengast v. Spatz et al., 283 N. Y. 573, 27 N. E. (2d) 437
(1940); Van de Bogart v. Onondaga Litholite Co., 274 N. Y. 595, 10 N. E. (2d)
568 (1937); Bennett v. Marine Works, Inc. et al., 273 N. Y. 429, 7 N. E. (2d)
847 (1937).
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spite the fact that the accidents occurred in the salesmen's
own garages or driveways."
Another unusual example of the going-to-work theory is
found in Buckignani v. Donald Taylor Co. 5 The deceased
had been intermittently employed on some. construction
work at Riker's Island, off the mainland of New York City.
After his last period of employment, he had been told to
come back in a few days at which time he would either be
reemployed or told when work would be available. While
being transported to the island for this purpose, -he was
drowned when the employer's steamboat blew up and sank.
Additional facts supporting the claim in this case were that
the deceased still carried a pass, had left his tools on the
island, and his job had not been given to anyone else.
11.
Injuries at Work
Of course, if a man, while working at his machine in a
factory, is hit on the head, in the presence of witnesses, by
something which falls from the ceiling, there is no doubt
that he was injured while at work, and that the facts neces-
sary to establish the claim are readily provable. The situa-
tion to be adjudicated, however, is not always quite so
simple. To provide for unwitnessed accidents, the New York
law states that "it shall be presumed in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary... that the claim comes
within the provision" of the statute. 6 This presumption,
coupled with another that the injury did not result solely
from the intoxication of the employee while on duty,' was
applied in McKenna v. Atlas Contractors Equipment
14 Eaton v. Webster Motors of Glen Falls, Inc. et al., 291 N. Y. 699, 52 N. E.
(2d) 592 (1943): Madelung v. Dale Radio Co. et al., 287 N. Y. 556, 38 N. E.
(2d) 225 (1941).
15 281 N.Y. 707,23 N.E. (2d) 540 (1939).
16 NEw YORK WoR.MzrNa's COMPESATION LAW § 21(1).
17 Naw YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 21(4).
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Corp.,8 where the body of a watchman was found in the
shanty where he worked, near a burned mattress. The
autopsy revealed both carbon monoxide poisoning and the
presence of alcohol. An award was upheld in the absence
of any explanation of how the accident occurred.
An illustration of the more common application of the
presumption that the claim is lawful is found in Kleid v.
Carr Bros.'9 The work of the claimant's decedent took him
about the city and into the subways. His body was found
on the tracks in a subway station, at a point which indi-
cated that he had come onto the tracks from a sort of ex-
tension of the subway platform, his presence on that exten-
sion being unexplained. Affirmance of the award was based
not only on the statutory presumption against suicide, but
also on an admission, found in a report by the employer to
the board, to the effect that the decedent was engaged in
his regular occupation when killed.
There are numerous cases in which it is not clearly estab-
lished that the presumption-that the claim is within the
provisions of the statute-was employed; rather, it may be
found that the fact finding board, from some substantial evi-
dence, inferred that the claimant was at work when injured.
Thus, a performer in an ice show was granted compensation
when she fell while practicing in the afternoon at a public ice
rink.20 Of course, difficulties of this sort, i.e., whether the
employee was in the course of employment, arise more often
in death cases.2' In many of these, the awards are sup-
ported by the rather slim evidence that the worker was en-
gaged in his employment when killed. One case also illus-
trated the applicability of the presumption against the in-
18 300 N. Y. 317, 90 N. E. (2d) 479 (1950).
19 300 N. Y. 270, 90 N. E. (2d) 185 (1949).
20 Lewis v. Hotel St. Regis et al., 287 N. Y. 598, 38 N. E. (2d) 708 (1941).
21 Landrum v. Congress Motor Corp. et al., 301 N. Y. 544, 93 N. E. (2d) 341
(1950); Mata v. Phoenix Construction Associates et al., 283 N. Y. 571, 27 N. E.
(2d) 436 (1940); State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance v. Grain Handling
Corp. et al., 272 N. Y. 548, 4 N. E. (2d) 730 (1936).
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jury having resulted from the employee's intoxication, since
there was actually a great deal of evidence that the claimant
was intoxicated when he was killed.22
One more case deserves comment in this section because
of its unusual facts.2 3 A nurse in one of the city-owned hos-
pitals, while eating lunch supplied by the city in the nurses'
dining room, swallowed some food that was so hot that she
fainted. The resulting fall caused her hands to come into
contact with more and still hotter food. Of course, in a case
like that, there is really no doubt that the injury arose out
of and in the course of employment, but nonetheless, it is
a striking example of liability without fault attaching to
the employer.
III.
Personal Activities While at Work
In the early days of workmen's compensation, there were
a great many claims which were disputed on the grounds
that the damaging activity was something personal to the
claimant. Such was Lief v. A. Walzer & Son,24 in which
a traveling salesman injured his eye with'a hairbrush when
the train on which he was riding jolted. Of course, brush-
ing his locks was a matter of personal vanity with the
worker, but the jolt of the train was a risk of the employ-
ment. Where a hospital provided maintenance for one of its
clerks who was subject to twenty-four hour call, an award
was allowed when the clerk was injured after stepping from
a bathtub.2" The affirmance of the award was based on the
general ground that such a person was in his employment
at all times while on the premises.
22 Landrum v. Congress Motor Corp. et al., supra note 21.
23 Smith v. City of New York, 285 N. Y. 646, 33 N. E. (2d) 561 (1941).
24 272 N.Y. 542, 4 N. E. (2d) 727 (1936).
25 Wood's Estate v. Kings Park State Hospital et al., 293 N. Y. 919, 60 N. E.
(2d) 129 (1944).
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A unique case which can fairly be treated under the head-
ing of personal activities resulting in injury is that of Kali-
koff v. John Lucas & Co.26 The claimant, a salesman, was
allowed to charge his expense account for the purchase of
cigars, etc., for his customers. While making such a pur-
chase, he was bitten by a cat; he was again bitten by the
same cat while taking it to the board of health for a rabies
test. An award was allowed the claimant for serious psychic




It is common practice today for employers to encourage
and sponsor athletic and recreational activities among their
employees. The question of whether injuries sustained due
to participation in these activities are compensable has been
answered both ways. Generally, the problem resolves itself
into a question of fact, such factors as knowledge of the
employer, the degree of employer sponsorship and encour-
agement, and the incidence of the sport or recreation to the
employment being given consideration. Thus, where the
claimant was hurt while playing volleyball on the employ-
er's premises during lunch hour, an award was allowed
when it was shown that the employer knew of the practice
and that one of its officials participated in it.2 7 But on the
same day that the Court of Appeals affirmed this award,
it reversed another given to a claimant who had been in-
jured while playing baseball in a public park.2" Although
the league in which the claimant was playing was to a de-
gree sponsored by the employer, it was held that the sport
26 297 N. Y. 663, 76 N. E. (2d) 324 (1947).
27 Brown v. United Services for Air, Inc. et al. 298 N. Y. 901, 84 N. E. (2d)
810 (1949).
28 Wilson v. General Motors Corp. et al., 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. (2d) 781
(1949).
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was not reasonably incident to the employment. A different
type of recreational case is illustrated by Piusinski v. Tran-
sit Valley Country Club.2 9 The claimant, a caddy employed
by the country club, was struck by a ball while playing golf
with other caddies. It was shown that the golf practice and
golf tournaments were recognized group activities for the
caddies and an incident to their customary employment.
In recent years, there has been an increasing number of
claims arising out of "horseplay" indulged in by employees
at their work. It is possible to distinguish the results in
some of the cases on the basis of employer knowledge and
encouragement, or lack of discouragement, of the activities
and circumstances prompting or leading up to the occur-
rence. Two of the most important of these cases, both very
recent, involved the same kind of violent and vicious prac-
tical joke, i.e., offering a fellow worker a drink from a bottle
labeled whiskey or gin, but which in truth contained danger-
ous carbon tetrachloride. The settings for the two pranks
were, however, basically different. In McCartky v. Rem-
ington-Rand Inc.,30 holiday festivities were under way at the
plant, and there was evidence to support findings that the
employer knew of but failed to discourage the drinking of
intoxicants during the holiday season. But in Burns v. Mer-
tit Engineering Co.3 the fellow employee who duped the
claimant into drinking the poison had no such circumstances
surrounding his vicious act. Nevertheless, the award was
upheld. Perhaps this latter case may be more logically clas-
sified with the "assault" cases which will be considered in
the following section.
An innocent, though nonetheless tragic, illustration of the
"friendly" horseplay injury is found in another recent case,32
29 283 N. Y. 674, 28 N. E. (2d) 401 (1940).
30 300 N. Y. 715, 92 N. E. (2d) 58 (1950).
31 301 N. Y. 131, ..._N. E. (2d).... (1951).
32 Industrial Commissioner v. McCarthy, 295 N. Y. 443, 68 N. E. (2d) 434
(1946).
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in which a waiter was fatally stabbed when he made a pass
at a fellow employee who held a knife in his hand. In turn-
ing away to avoid the gesture, the co-worker accidentally
struck the waiter in the heart. There was evidence and a
finding that the restaurant owner was well acquainted with
the fact that similar sparring was habitual with his em-
ployees, and it was also shown that indulgence in brief and




Injuries sustained by employees in personal fights pro-
duce many compensation claims and not a few awards."3
Where such awards have been affirmed, the rationale is
that, whatever the particular facts, the claimant, whether
or not he participated in the brawl, was the victim rather
than the instigator of the affray. In a famous case,34 a bar-
tender, while on his way home, was assaulted by a customer
whom he had ejected from the tavern earlier in the evening.
Actually, this case does not belong in this article because
the award was ultimately disallowed, but the holding of the
Court of Appeals was that the board could have found,
although it did not, that there was such continuity in time
and place that the quarrel and the subsequent assault could
be taken as one transaction. A case in which the award was
sustained was Levy v. World-Telegram Corp.35 While carry-
ing newspapers to his employer's truck, the claimant's de-
cedent was tickled by an unknown assailant. Believing that
a particular fellow employee was guilty, Levy struck and
kicked at the man and called him a vile name, whereupon
the fellow employee hit Levy so hard that he died from the
33 See 49 MicH. L. REv. 452 (1951).
34 McGrinder v. Sullivan et al., 290 N. Y. 11, 47 N. E. (2d) 421 (1943).
35 285 N. Y. 533, 32'N. E. (2d) 827 (1941).
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resulting injuries. The board made a well-nigh fictional find-
ing that Levy was not the instigator or aggressor, but was
merely retaliating for an initial assault on himself.
A much less innocent affair gave rise to the case of Heim-
roth v. Elk Transportation Co.3" The claimant's decedent,
a night watchman, had an arrangement whereby Kick, a fel-
low employee, came to the plant on Sunday and holiday
mornings to drive him home. Some altercation occurred in
the early hours of one of those mornings, and Heimroth was
found dead. Kick later pleaded guilty to second degree mur-
der, and at the compensation hearings testified that he had
thrown a hammer at Heimroth causing his death after
Heimroth had made remarks about a girl friend of Kick's.
The defense interposed was that this was a personal quarrel
not related to the employment, but there was evidence that
Kick had robbed the employer's safe at the time of the
occurrence. The board and the courts thought that there
was enough evidence to justify a rejection of part of Kick's
story and a finding that the killing was actually connected
with the robbery, so that Heimroth was adjudged the inno-




The New York statute provides that there shall be no
liability for compensation "when the injury has been solely
occasioned . . . by wilful intention of the injured employee
to bring about the injury or death of himself or another." 37
It does not, however, follow absolutely that death by suicide
is not compensable. In Pushkarowitz v. A & M Kramer,38
the decedent on account of whose death the claim was filed,
had suffered a permanent partial loss of use of one eye
36 288 N. Y. 716, 43 N. E. (2d) 95 (1942).
37 NBw YORK XVORKxm's COMoONSATiON LAW § 21(3).
38 300 N. Y. 637, 90 N. E. (2d) 494 (1950).
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while working for one employer, and later had suffered a
further loss of use of the same eye while working for an-
other. The result was that, since he had lost the other eye
during childhood, he was blinded. He caused his own death
by drinking hydrochloric acid. An award of death benefits
was made and sustained on the finding that he had suffered
from depressive psychosis as a result of the eye injury, that
his death was due to accidental injuries, which caused the
insanity with which he was suffering when he killed himself.
An interesting case to compare with the Pushkarowitz
case is Brown v. New York State Training School for Girls,"9
where a death award made by the board was reversed by
the Court of Appeals. Brown had, by mistake, swallowed
a poison tablet instead of a mild sedative, the latter having
been prescribed by his physician after an operation, which
in turn had been necessitated by an injury received in the
course of his employment. The Court of Appeals held that
Brown's mistake was not a natural consequence of or direct-
ly connected with his work, especially since there was no
proof of mental derangement or impaired vision.
The presumption against suicide found in the statute pro-
vided a partial basis for the award where a theatre porter
was found in the basement of the building with his head
under the burner of a hot water tank.4 ° Although death
had resulted from inhalation of gas, the porter did have
duties in connection with the tank, and the employer failed
to overcome the presumption.
VI.
Going Home
Where injuries have been sustained by an employee re-
turning to his home from work, awards are sustained on the
grounds that the trip is a necessary incident to the employ-
39 285 N.Y. 37, 32 N. E. (2d) 783 (1941).
40 Phillips v. R & M Operating Corp. et al., 298 N. Y. 608, 81 N. E. (2d)
333 (1948).
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ment. Thus, in Welz v. Markel Service, Inc.,41 a claim in-
vestigator required to hold himself in readiness for night
work, left his home one night to investigate an accident.
He later telephoned his report to his superior, and then,
while returning to his home collapsed on a subway platform,
receiving fatal injuries. The award was affirmed because,
under the circumstances of the case, the return of Welz to
his home was an incident of his employment.
A complicating factor which is sometimes introduced is
the discharge of personal affairs while making the journey
home. Thus in Callan v. State Highway Dep't,42 the claim-
ant had gone to the paymaster's office to sign a payroll, and
when injured 'was being taken home by his foreman on
a direct route between the two points. It was shown that
the two men had consumed somewhat more time than would
normally be required for the trip, but an award was never-
theless allowed, probably on the theory that the primary
purpose of the trip was an incident to the claimant's em-
ployment. An illustration of the more common and con-
ventional claim in this type of case is Heary v. Draudt,43
in which an award was allowed when the claimant's de-
cedent was killed when returning from his work on his em-
ployer's truck.
VIII.
Heart Injuries as Accidental Injuries
A debate of long standing in the courts seems to have
been put to rest in New York, at least temporarily, by the
case of Masse v. lames H. Robinson Co.,44 where Chief
Judge Loughran for the Court of Appeals stated this rule:
A heart injury such as coronary occlusion or thrombosis
when brought on by overexertion or strain in the course of
41 296 N. Y. 640, 69 N. E. (2d) 682 (1941).
42 293 N. Y. 743, 56 N. E. (2d) 742 (1944).
43 288 N.Y. 593, 42 N. E. (2d) 602 (1942).
44 301 N. Y. 34, 92 N. E. (2d) 56, 57 (1950).
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daily work is compensable, though a pre-existing pathology
may have been a contributing factor.
The Masse opinion frankly admits that the court may, in
the past, have denied claims for compensation in cases not
easily distinguishable from Masse's application.45 The court
made no apologies for those aberrations, if such they were.
But referring to the old question which underlies this whole
problem, the court said that whether a particular event was
an industrial accident is to be determined, not by any legal-
istic definition, but "by the common sense viewpoint of the
average man." Viewing the Masse case in its long-range
significance, it is not only a holding that a pre-existing heart
disease aggravated by overexertion in the course of employ-
ment is compensable as an accidental injury; it disposes,
apparently, of the old idea that to be accidental, an injury
must be assignable to a single, particular catastrophic or
extraordinary event, identified in time and place.4" It is not
easy to reconcile the numerous conflicting decisions in this
area of compensation law, but it is submitted that the Masse
decision, as the culmination of a line of decisions permitting
recoveries in heart injury cases,4' has enunciated a work-
able rule the application of which will result in substantial
justice.
Conclusion
The foregoing review of cases in several areas of work-
men's compensation law should well illustrate the difficulty
in applying the statutory language to particular factual
situations. The problem is usually one of fact rather than
law because of the unlimited number of possible combina-
45 See, e.g., Dworak v. E. Greenbaum Co., 287 N. Y. 555, 38 N. E. (2d)
224 (1941) ; La Fountain v. La Fountain, 284 N. Y. 727, 31 N. E. (2d) 199 (1940);
Scully v. Linwood Amusement Corp., 268 N. Y. 512, 198 N. E. 380 (1935).
46 Lerner et al. v. Rump Bros. et al., 241 N. Y. 153, 149 N. E. 334 (1925);
Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co. et al., 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 366 (1925).
47 E.g., Ruby v. Lustig et al., 299 N. Y. 759, 87 N. E. (2d) 672 (1949);
McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp. et al., 288 N. Y. 614, 42 N. E.
(2d) 613 (1942); Green v. Geiger et al., 280 N. Y. 610, 20 N. E. (2d) 559 (1939).
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tions of circumstances giving rise to employment-connected
injuries. The same factor makes it well-nigh impossible to
draw any broad conclusions on the state of the law of
workmen's compensation in regard to any particular type
of case. But it can be Stated that in virtually all cases a
liberal application of the statute is and will be attempted
so that the broad policy it enunciates, mitigation of the
financial straits of the injured workman, may be effectively
carried out. This article has attempted to point out some
of the more interesting recent cases which define the limits
of that policy today.
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